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Introduction
          espite the recognition of the importance of the           
          p u b l i c  u n i v e r s i t i e s  ( P U s )  a n d  t h e
increasing complexity of the university business 
model, the PUs governance system has not changed 
significantly. There have been a limited number of 
mostly cosmetic changes without a coherent policy or 
strategy at work (Bakri, 2003; Navaratnam, 2006: 136). 
The “undue” student and staff political activism, the 
rising spectre of unemployed graduates, a vibrant 
private tertiary education sector and the fall in the 
ranking of PUs in international surveys have created 
some disquiet about the state of PUs (Ministry of 
Higher Education Report (MoHE), 2006; Navaratnam, 
2006). The PUs governance debate and some changes 
have focused mostly on the structures and powers of 
the university vis-à-vis the minister. In the following 
sections of this short paper several salient missing 
parameters of PUs governance and the corresponding 
implications for PUs performance are briefly outlined.
Firstly, for all intents and purposes the PUs are a part of 
the civil service. Although the University and 
University Colleges Act (1972) grants the PUs some 
autonomy to accept, modify or reject rules and 
regulations emanating from central agencies, it is 
almost perfunctory that their respective Board of 
Directors (BOD) will accept directives in toto. Being 
mostly ex-civil servants, the BOD’s belief in the 
rules-based management is still unshaken. There is 
great reluctance to distinguish or differentiate the role 
of the universities from the rest of the public sector. It is 
shackled tightly by the tentacles of the civil service. The 
universities have fought many a losing battle to seek 
some exception. The recent one is the raising of 
retirement age of the quintessential knowledge workers 
– the academic staff, and the Penilaian Tahap Kecekapan 
pass rates. The source of this treatment cannot be found 
in the legal texts. The explanation for this treatment is 
in the soft institutional and human aspect of the PUs.  
There is no sign that these parameters of governance 
will change in the near future as evidenced by the 
recent statement by the Deputy Prime Minister. “It will 
not be possible to separate scheme of service for public 
universities…” (The Star, p. 6, 19 August 2006).  The 
professional values and stance of the civil servants, i.e., 
to implement policies and programmes “passionately” 
is expected of the university academics. They are not to 
engage in discussions of the technocratic or political 
merit of public policies and decisions. There is great 
incentive and scope for showing support for current 
policies and views whereas dissenting views and 
positions as well as scholastic works without hidden 
agenda are not received. The continued treatment of the 
PUs as part of the civil service limits the room for real 
 
governance changes. Reification of hierarchy  and 
rank, dominance of authority over  intellectuality, 
intellectual meekness and a culture of conformism are 
some of the “soft” governance parameters that are 
likely to remain stubbornly a part of the PUs despite 
some symbolic changes in the nominal structures. 
Secondly, MoHE faced with growing disaffection over 
the state of PUs, has quite expectedly built a larger 
bureaucracy to take charge of the tertiary affairs. The 
impending creation of an enlarged and empowered 
quality assurance agency will further cement the rising 
role of MoHE in tertiary education. A stronger MoHE is 
likely to be more invasive of university affairs, prone to 
greater centralisation and preferring standardisation – 
the antithesis to autonomy (Bakri, 2003: 236; Hazman, 
2005). MoHE is more likely to “steer and row” the PUs. 
Any suggestion that MoHE should limit its role to the 
steering function is viewed as diminution rather than 
rationalisation of roles. Recognising the power and 
control of MoHE over the universities, the BODs and 
the Vice-Chancellors (VCs) speak softly, privately, 
politely and politically correctly on issues of great 
importance to the future of PUs. Any impolite reactions 
to MoHE’s positions and policies have and will usually 
receive a sharp rebuke or earn the displeasure of senior 
MoHE bureaucrats. In addition there is the attendant 
uncertainty about the tenure of the irksome VCs.
Thirdly, over the years there is a trend towards greater 
interest in and emphasis on managerial competence as 
opposed to the traditional academic accomplishment 
and distinction in the choice of key university 
administrators. Management rather than leadership 
appears to be the key attribute. This trend saw the 
appointment of senior and retired Administrative and 
Diplomatic Officers as VCs . These appointees trained 
as true blue civil servants (especially in the 
Administrative and Diplomatic Service Officers) found 
the universities to be quite disorderly, unfocused and 
having unhealthy levels of autonomy – all features 
found to be inconsistent with the demands for a 
modern organisational management. Despite the overt 
unpopularity of the old command and control style of 
leadership and management, it continues to thrive in 
the academia as it does also elsewhere. Homogeneity 
and standardisation are in vogue and legitimised by 
recent quality certifications to   achieve operational 
discipline (often confused as operational excellence). A 
more collective, collegial, consultative and 
servant-leadership is, increasingly, not a common 
institutional feature in PUs (Marginson and Considine, 
2000). 
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Fourthly, at a time when level five or servant leadership 
(Greenleaf, 1996) is promoted and heroic leadership is 
reviled (Mintzberg, 2004: 94), there is growing 
reification of the reverential VCs. Even such towering 
figures as Royal Professor Ungku Aziz did not become 
the face of the university. As the stature and profile of 
the more recent VCs increased and as their powers 
become concentrated and unchallenged, there is a 
growing sense of reverence, not mere respect, of the 
VCs. These universities cultivated a culture of 
reification and worshipping that is highly smothering 
to the intellectual tradition that the university is 
expected to demonstrate. Some VCs conceived of their 
role, not as the head of a public institution, but the head 
of a government institution and therefore, become 
politically partisan. This role concept encourages the 
PUs to be legitimisers rather than critical reviewers and 
at times, arbitrators as the Prime Minister has outlined 
in his recent speech at Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) 
launching the Tan Sri Noordin Sopiee Chair for 
Global Studies. This shortsighted and self-serving 
stance diminishes the role of the PUs. It does not 
become a centre of excellence but a centre of 
partisanship. A sort of intellectual “groupthink” 
develops adding credence to dominant viewpoints 
and expresses near hostility to alternative thinking. In 
the long run, the university community “loses” its 
ability to “think” beyond or outside the dominant or 
official or popular viewpoints. 
Fifthly, the MoHE Report (2006) dwelled much on the 
legal position of the BOD vis-à-vis the Senate and 
the Minister. Legal autonomy and actual autonomy 
are not the same concepts. The BOD must be mentally 
prepared to exercise authority. Will the BOD members 
step up to the challenge? Will they be comfortable     
doing it? Civil servants schooled for almost 2-3 decades 
in the art of active conformance to and great reverence 
for precedence and procedures cannot make 
paradigmatic changes in the twilight years of their life. 
Contrary to the usual and perfunctory talk about 
innovation, leadership and entrepreneurship, the BOD 
is risk aversive, more of a follower than leader and 
more conventional than inventional. They fully 
understand the limits of their powers vis-à-vis the VC 
and especially the Minister of Higher Education. Even 
corporate directors succumb to the style of their more 
numerous public sector colleagues (Akroyd and 
Akroyd, 1999: 177). After all, PUs are public 
organisations and therefore, the BOD members from 
the public sector hold all the aces. 
Conclusion
The present discussion of PUs governance tends to 
focus on the legal and institutional aspects of PUs 
governance leaving aside some very fundamental 
parameters of PUs governance. The totality of PUs 
governance can only be understood when the soft 
governance parameters are laid bare alongside the 
traditional foci of PUs governance. The role of MoHE, 
the managerialist orientation, the reification of the VC 
and the bureaucrat dominated BOD define the complex 
and conflicting parameters of PUs governance that is 
often missing in the governance debate. There is as 
much in the culture of the universities as there is in the 
legal texts of the universities’ constitution that 
constrains its performance. The basic governance 
premises must be deeply and critically examined to 
reengineer and empower the PUs to achieve world class 
fitness.
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Recognising the power and 
control of MoHE over the 
universities, the BODs and the 
VCs speak soft, privately, 
politely and politically correctly 
on issues of great importance to 
the future of PUs. Any impolite 
reactions to MoHE’s positions 
and policies has and will 
usually receive a sharp rebuke 
or earn the displeasure of the 
senior MoHE bureaucrats with 
the attendant uncertainty about 
the tenure of the irksome VC.
